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Mobilising (Global) Democracy: A Political Reading of 
Mobility between Universal Rights and the Mob1 
Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans  
 
Abstract 
 
This article argues that a political reading of mobility is instrumental for 
understanding the role of democracy within globalised structures of power. Relegated 
to a socio-economic background that prompts new engagements with democracy, 
mobility has been neglected as a condition of possibility and as a form of political 
democratic practice. Drawing on Georg Simmel’s sociology of money, we show that 
practices of mobility become democratic moments in relation to structures of power 
that are constituted across the territorial circumscription of national states. Understood 
as a particular form of sociality, mobility can work upon structures of power through 
universal rights and the politics of the ‘mob’. In this sense, practices of mobility are 
also democratic inscriptions of equality.    
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At a time when the borders of nation-states appear to have become increasingly 
porous and democracy is often entangled with imperial and neoliberal projects, there 
has been a resurgence of interest in the concept. From cosmopolitan democracy that 
aims at trans-nationalising liberal decision-making to communicative democracy that 
rethinks the public sphere under global conditions, and from democracy as 
governance to radical democracy, the adequacy of the concept of democracy for the 
international is increasingly under scrutiny.  
 
In particular two developments are at the heart of the resurgence of democracy 
debates in International Relations. First, the continuing intensification of the 
contradiction between structures of power, which operate on a global or international 
scale, and structures of democratic representation, accountability and legitimacy, 
which operate mainly within and through state institutions.2 This contradiction 
grounds the question of ‘what democracy can possibly be given to the structures of 
world politics’?3 The second development is that democracy functions as a global 
concept attached to an increasingly wide variety of practices. With the demise of the 
Cold War, Western notions of democracy lost their ‘others’, variously named as 
communism, dictatorship, tyranny, or totalitarianism.4 In both democratic theory and 
politics, this raised the question of what are democracy’s functional, territorial and/or 
temporal limits which facilitate judgements of what counts and does not count as 
democratic practice. These two problematiques are closely interrelated. The creation 
of democratic practices in the globalised structures of power implies defining the 
nature of those political practices as democratic, thus leading to the question of what 
are the limits of democracy. For the purposes of this article, democracy is not 
considered as a particular political regime or as a ‘model’ of representation or 
participation, but a practice that disturbs the status quo, the given political order.5 
Starting from this understanding of democracy, the article argues that mobility, has 
been historically a democratic practice and that it can also give democracy to global 
structures of power. Its lead question is: how do practices of mobility constitute a 
democratic moment? The question leads us to explore the distributions of and claims 
to freedom and equality through practices of mobility which are constitutive of global 
power structures.  
 
To this purpose, we proceed in three stages. First, we contend that a political reading 
of mobility is needed to understand its function as democratic practice working upon 
structures of power. Much of the globalised structuration of power bears a relation to 
mobility that transgresses national boundaries and the spatial logic through which 
they are constituted. Nonetheless, the potential of mobility remains underexplored in 
much of the literature on global democracy. Thus, secondly, we propose to start from 
a particular historical development of mobility and theorise it as political, as 
democratic practice. Rather than starting from the opposition of 
territorialisation/deterritorialisation, bordered/fluid, immobile/nomadic which informs 
much of the research on global democracy and mobility today, we draw on Georg 
Simmel’s sociology of money to analyse mobility as a condition of possibility and 
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practice of democracy. We reconceptualise mobility as a form of sociality with the 
stranger that leads to the creation of spheres of rights and mass mobilisation. We 
argue specifically that universal rights and ‘the mob’ represent two different traditions 
of democracy. While the former is fairly well developed in studies of post-national 
citizenship and human rights, the connection between mobility, mass politics and 
democracy is much less present in studies of global and transnational democracy.  
Finally, we show that the democratic quality of practices of mobility functions 
through the inscription of equality, both through the articulation of equal rights and 
through the egalitarian force of the ‘mob’ or mass politics. This inscription of equality 
brought about by mobility through rights and the ‘mob’ can make mobility do 
democratic work directly in the global realm.  
Global democracy and mobility 
 
The main traditions of thought where we would expect to find a theorisation of the 
connection between transnational mobility and democracy beyond the nation-state 
largely ignore the intimate connection between mobility and democracy. Mobility 
remains a relatively marginal issue in the literature on global democracy. This 
literature focuses on questions of institutional accountability and transparency in a 
globalising world as well as the institutional question of how to constitute democratic 
institutions and transnational public spheres on a global scale.6 The alternative 
literature on global mobility and transnational flows seems to largely ignore the 
political and democratic nature of mobilities. It focuses on the constitution of socio-
economic networks and societal flows across states, thereby separating a political 
democratic reading of mobility from its socio-economic significance.7  
 
The absence of linkage between these two approaches is not simply the result of 
disciplinary divides (between sociology and political science, between a political and 
a more socio-economic theorising of the international, etc.). Rather, one of the main 
reasons is that politics is primarily interpreted as a question of the formation and 
exercise of democratic authority formulated in terms of representative institutions, 
political accountability and a public sphere where opinions can circulate and be 
negotiated. Although the need to renegotiate democratic authority can follow changes 
in transnational socio-economic mobility, mobility itself is not seen as a political 
practice, let alone a democratic political one. For example, migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean – the figure par excellence of the globalised word – are not understood 
as making a political claim but are represented as destitute and frustrated people 
driven by economic and/or humanitarian needs in an increasingly globalised ‘society’.  
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Waves of Would-Be Immigrants Target EU Shores 
06/24/2008 Spiegel Online 
… 
The immigrants arrive in Libya from central Africa and from there are ferried to 
European shores, often by organized crime groups, in rickety, overcrowded boats. 
Most are trying to escape dire poverty at home. Many give up everything for the 
journey (…) in the hopes that, once they arrive in Europe, they will be able to 
support their families from afar.8  
 
Their mobility seems to remain largely apolitical in the sense that they do not 
intentionally seek to renegotiate the structures of power and authority through their 
mobility. Migrants are represented as simply driven by individual desires and 
economically needs. In addition, they are often rendered as a disorderly mass of 
people made up of individuals frustrated with living conditions and seeking to cross 
territory and water. As this quote indicated, the organisational aspect of their mobility 
is the responsibility of criminal groups, which reinforces the difficulty to read 
transnational mobility as political. Criminalisation has historically been a key 
instrument of keeping social problems and developments out of the political. 
 
In this reading, mobility is part of global societal and economic developments that 
cannot be contained by territorial boundaries. They set the socio-economic conditions 
against which questions of governance and authority beyond the nation-state emerge. 
In line with functionalist,9 regional integration10  and transnational politics11 
approaches, cross-border mobility and circulation require forms of governing that 
move beyond the nation-state. Since they cannot be contained within the territorial 
state, they present a challenge to national governments. Migration, for example, 
interlocks different societies – the society of origin, the societies through which one 
travels, and the society of destination. One of the political responses to this cross-
national societal interlocking is to increase cooperation between states and/or to set up 
either regional or global political authorities. For example, the European integration 
project is often legitimised in these terms. Further integration in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice is justified through the increased need for a common migration 
policy so as to deal more effectively with immigration. 
 
In these accounts, democracy emerges as a problem of the legitimacy of these 
regional and global governing authorities. The central issues concern the transnational 
or global constitution of a public sphere, the institutionalisation of representation and 
accountability mechanisms, and public participation. The questions and the models 
that drive these debates do not really differ in whether they are applied to state, 
regional or global authority structures. Global and regional democracy is a matter of 
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whether or not and how it is possible to scale up national institutional mechanisms to 
transnational, regional and global institutions.12 The two main approaches here are 
cosmopolitan democracy and communicative democracy. 
 
Cosmopolitan democracy builds upon the structures of global governance with the 
added requirements of public participation and public accountability. These 
democratic injunctions can be achieved either by means of reforming international 
institutions and the processes of global governance to integrate democratic criteria 
with the technocratic ones of efficiency or by the mobilisation of global civil society 
as a democratic global actor.13 In these approaches, cosmopolitan democracy is seen 
as achievable either in a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ fashion. David Held’s work 
typifies a top-down reform of the international system, ranging from a more inclusive 
UN Security Council to ultimately cosmopolitan law, a global legal system and a 
global parliament. Internationally, democratic practices reiterate the role of civil 
society in the domestic polity and propose to create new institutions that would 
reinforce the rights of the global citizen.  
 
Unlike cosmopolitan democracy, communicative democracy considers the discursive 
sources of governance transnationally and not just the institutional ones.14 It tries to 
solve the condition of the territorially and nationally bounded democracy by 
downplaying it – if communication or deliberation are the defining features of 
democracy, then democratic outcomes can be achieved independent of territorial and 
national borders. For Habermas, democracy emerges by means of discursive 
procedures through which individuals attempt to build grounds for the legitimacy of 
their claims.15 Nonetheless, communicative democracy also ultimately attempts to 
‘scale up’ processes of discursive legitimation and negotiation that take place within 
the nation-state and does not solve the problem of borders and boundaries that remain 
necessary for the possibility of global communicative processes.  
 
In both approaches, mobility, if considered at all, operates in the background as socio-
economic flows which create a need for scaling up democratic structures of 
accountability or discursive legitimation. Therefore, by locking mobility into the 
socio-economic reading, these debates do not touch on how mobility itself can be a 
political democratic practice. The cosmopolitan and communicative democracy 
approaches cannot think democracy in relation to the practices of mobility 
themselves. Rather, they focus on how regional or global governance can move from 
a community of states and a politics of inter-state bargaining to a community of 
individuals and a politics of rights. Democracy is fundamentally a question of 
building an institutional political structure and a regional or global demos. These need 
to guarantee that mobility can be governed through democratic processes and that the 
demos does not become the ‘mob’ or a conflictual crowd, but is an ordered audience, 
public or electorate. From this perspective, the structures of political power act upon 
the immigrants’ mobility as an issue of security, economics, or humanitarianism. But 
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their mobility itself is not read politically: the immigrants crossing the Mediterranean 
remain destitute, abused, needy individuals constituting a flow that needs to be 
administered, preferably through democratic institutions. 
 
Similarly, the other body of literature that theorises mobility, the ‘mobility turn’ in 
sociology and geography, does not consider democracy in relation to mobility. The 
lack of engagement with democracy is firstly underpinned by a similar socio-
economic reading of mobility. The literature on mobility is mainly concerned with the 
governance of mobility, the increase in flows and the acceleration of mobility rather 
than its political (or democratic) nature.16 Even when mobility is directly considered 
in relation to the constitution of mobile and immobile subjects, social exclusion and 
citizenship, mobility as a condition of possibility of democracy and democratic 
practice is not analysed.17 
 
Thus, the literatures that we would expect to engage with the relationship between 
mobility and democracy mostly ignore how mobility has historically created a 
condition of possibility of democracy by the mix of enlarging the possibility for a 
universalising equality and freedom and making practices of mass movement 
politically forceful. The remainder of the article seeks to recover this specific political 
reading of mobility for the purpose of demonstrating that practices of mobility are not 
just flows or networks upon which democratic institutions act but that they are an 
immanent part of democratic politics; in other words, mobility can function as  a 
political democratic practice through the inscription of equality. Introducing this point 
of view into the question of transnational, regional or global democracy will allow us 
to see that democracy can be brought to global structures of power through practices 
of mobility.   
Mobility, money and strangers 
 
Rather than a new development brought about by globalisation and to which different 
theories of democracy attempt to find a palliative, a political reading of mobility 
reveals a more intimate connection between practices of mobility and democracy. We 
argue that the understanding of democracy as practice, as a particular process is 
historically connected with a particular development in modernity.18 Drawing on 
Simmel’s sociology of money, we show how mobility became entwined with 
democracy through a double inscription of equality via rights and mass mobilisation.19 
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Simmel connects the role of mobility in modern societies with the circulation of 
money in the mature money economies and processes of exchange. Circulation, 
Simmel has argued, was an ‘original form and function of social life’.20 It is the most 
developed form of social interaction and social interactions generally need to be 
thought on the model of the exchange. Through exchange, society became an ‘inner 
bond between men [sic]’ rather than a ‘simple collection of individuals’.21 Money 
made possible a particular form of social interaction and the transformation of society 
by rendering everything quantifiable according to a single measure and allows for 
comparisons among previously incommensurable objects. Money ‘commensurates 
incommensurabilities’ and creates a particular form of egalitarianism and 
equivalence.22 As Simmel puts it, ‘The essence of all money… is its unconditional 
interchangeability, the internal uniformity that makes each piece exchangeable for 
another…’.23 This interchangeable and abstract commensurability creates new 
relationships between elements that would otherwise have no connection. Money, 
Simmel argues, ‘has provided us with the sole possibility for uniting people while 
excluding everything personal and specific’.24  
 
Simmel’s reading of money takes up a historical materialist analysis according to 
which capitalist money and exchange entail particular social effects: money creates a 
form of sociality that is based on equivalence, reciprocity and the rejection of 
traditional family and communitarian values.25 From this perspective, it is important 
to understand mobility not simply as a form of disconnectedness, fluidity or 
nomadism, but as a particular form of sociality and interaction brought about by 
money and exchange.26 Money therefore appears as a social force that unmakes 
traditional social relations and replaces them with new forms of social interactions. As 
a form of sociality, mobility becomes a threat to entrenched hierarchical social 
relations and close-knit communities. This is particularly evident in the way societies 
experience the stranger who, according to Simmel, is the paradigmatic form of 
interaction brought about by mobility. The stranger is defined by a paradoxical 
relation to community. It is a form of mobility that fixes people to a specific 
community – strangers live in a community – but that simultaneously frees them from 
any specific ties to fixed communities – they do not belong to the community in an 
organic way. Money makes it possible to be in close-knit contact with other people 
without being organically or territorially bound to them. Money enables being within 
a community but not of community. 
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By socialising people as strangers, money places them in different types of 
relationships where hierarchies, differences between nobility and the lower orders 
become dangerously unstable. Money, Simmel argues, ‘becomes the centre of interest 
and the proper domain of individuals and classes who, because of their social 
position, are excluded from many kinds of personal and specific goals’.27 While the 
circulation of money unravels traditional community relations, money also threatens 
to unravel social hierarchies by offering those who had nothing, who were excluded 
from the possibility of achieving full membership in a community, access to the 
community and to social status. Even in the early stages of monetary transactions, in 
Rome or Greece for example, it was the emancipated slaves who were predisposed 
towards monetary transactions.28 Later on, monetary and financial transactions 
become associated with the Jews, while traders have generally been strangers. The 
‘power of money’, concludes Simmel, ‘contributes positively to the attainment of 
positions, influence and enjoyments wherever people are excluded from achieving, by 
certain direct means, social rank and fulfilment as officials or in professions from 
which they are barred’.29 Thus, money becomes in one sense a social equaliser, the 
means for those who are excluded from social status to attain some form of 
membership in society. By generalising a means of equivalence, the circulation of 
money inscribes equalitarian ideals and relations to the stranger at the heart of society. 
In what follows, we show how these social effects can become political through 
claims to human rights and mass or ‘mob’ mobilisation. 
Political mobility 1: universal rights 
 
Money introduces relations between strangers as relations mediated by abstract 
principles: ‘…with the stranger one has only certain more general qualities in 
common, whereas the relation to more organically connected persons is based on the 
commonness of specific differences from merely general features’.30 The peculiar 
generality and abstractness of relations to the stranger characterises them not through 
their individuality but rather through something that they have in common with other 
strangers. The relation between strangers is one of universals:  
 
… that which is common to two is perhaps never common only to them 
but belongs to a general conception which includes much else (…) 
similarity, harmony, and closeness are accompanied by the feeling that 
they are actually not the exclusive property of this particular relation, but 
stem from a more general one – a relation that potentially includes us 
and an indeterminate number of others, and therefore prevents that 
relation (…) from having an inner and exclusive necessity.31  
 
The connection between money and mobility is central for creating the conditions of 
possibility of a less organic and more abstract form of sociality that is at the same 
time a condition of possibility for extending freedom and equality beyond the 
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confines of close-knit community relations. Yet, this condition remains enacted 
through economic and social practices.32 Thus, although Simmel shows us how 
mobility as a particular form of sociality opens serious political questions about forms 
of allegiance, freedom, and equality, they remain locked within the socio-economic as 
a possibility. Mobility remains a social practice that is not necessarily political, but 
has a capacity to be so. 
 
How does one take these practices of mobility into a democratic political terrain? 
Through the generalisation of equivalence and exchange, mobility ensured the 
possibility for excluded social groups to enter the political process and accede to 
equality. Money created the conditions of possibility for sociality mediated through 
abstraction and equality of exchange rather than, say, hierarchy. The introduction of 
an abstract measure in the mediation of things – money and exchange value in the 
mature money economies – has as its correlate the introduction of an abstract measure 
– universal rights – in the mediation of conflict among social groups.33 The 
equivalence that money introduces between different objects is correlated with the 
equivalence between subjects. By exchanging equivalent for equivalent, subjects of 
exchange place themselves in positions of equality and inter-act through an abstract 
and universalisable duty. Thus, the central vehicle for the move of mobility from a 
form of sociality into a democratic practice is universal rights. As Simmel discusses in 
his analysis of the right of assistance to the poor, rights shifted assistance from the 
subjective arbitrariness of charity to an objective claim that the poor can make upon 
others. Rights did the double work of transforming the poor from an object into a 
subject who can act upon other subjects, and society more generally, and of 
connecting their claims to an abstract notion of humanity.34  
 
From this perspective, migrants traversing territories and seas to arrive in Europe can 
at least in principle claim at least minimal human rights. In doing so, they change a set 
of social and economic connections into claims that connect them to a political 
terrain, as long as the political authorities recognise the status of humanity in the form 
of a legal or quasi-legal system of rights. Human rights are in contemporary politics a 
central vehicle through which transversal mobilities work themselves into the political 
field, as noted in the idea of post-national citizenship.35 Money-strangers-rights are a 
continuum made possible by the introduction of an abstract measure within modern 
societies.  
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The democratic political terrain that mobility enters by ‘mobilising’ a rights status is 
defined through the relation between legally codified rights and public institutions. 
Mobility can function as a political democratic practice when it activates a legal status 
that can be mobilised within an institutional structure. In relation to transnational 
mobilities, this can imply either that mobile people deploy universal rights within 
democratic states or that mobile people claim rights against national and transnational 
structures of power. 
 
Therefore, mobile people work upon structures of power by claiming rights upon 
public and private authorities. Judicial systems are the institutional sites where these 
politics of mobility take place. In the end, transforming mobility from social into 
political (democratic) practice through universal rights appears to lead us back to the 
question posed by the global democracy literature on the nature of political 
institutions within which these rights can be legitimately claimed. So, are we back 
where we started? Is the problem ultimately that of scaling up democratic institutions 
that have been developed within the nation-state? Claiming rights through mobility 
has actually worked slightly differently. On the one hand, universal rights are carried 
by mobile people into national institutional arenas, as argued by the post-national 
citizenship literature. While the institutional structure is territorially bound to the 
nation-state, the people making rights claims within them do not belong to the state in 
the same sense as national citizens. They are strangers drawing on more abstract 
universal rights. As Soysal has remarked about the proliferation of transnational 
arrangement and human rights instruments, ’by setting norms, framing discourses, 
and engineering legal categories and legitimate models, they enjoin obligations on 
nation-states to take actions’.36  
 
On the other hand, contemporary politics also witnesses the rise of supra-national and 
transnational legal and quasi-legal institutions. Here, the political terrain is defined in 
terms of a constitutive tension between legal and political authority. However, legal 
authorities work on a wider scale than political authorities, which remain very much 
enclosed within the nation-state. This process of legalising transnational and 
international politics thus consists in a differential scaling up of democracy. The legal 
and quasi-legal institutions work beyond the nation-state seeking to constrain the 
national political authorities whose democratic legitimacy is constituted within the 
national states. The European Union and its European Court of Justice are particularly 
interesting cases here, given the multi-level political nature of the EU.37 
 
Nonetheless, the transformation of mobility into a political democratic practice 
through the mediation of the rights of strangers has important limitations. First, it 
works through an individualising process turning subject into rights holders who then 
also need access to the judicial (and administrative) systems where they can claim 
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their rights. Second, law entails a double process of particularisation.38 In its explicit 
form, particularising the universal can deny rights to categories of the population, 
based on racial, gender or class grounds. In its implicit form, it can restrict democracy 
and citizenship to particular institutions, agents, problems and procedures. The notion 
of rights therefore reproduces within democratic politics a distinction between masses 
and citizens.39 The masses refer here to the group of the people whose access to the 
rights status is severely limited, either by being denied rights or by their limited 
capacity to effectively claim rights. This distinction not only operates within a state 
but also in the state system.  
 
The immigrants seeking to traverse the Mediterranean fall within the category of the 
masses rather than of post-national citizens. Their capacity to access the institutions in 
which they can enact their already very limited rights claims is severely curtailed by 
means of an elaborate detention regime among others. Moreover, their access to 
democratic practices and democratic political institutions is restricted in terms of 
agents and procedures. Their access to rights is mediated through the legal field and 
legal agents. This is particularly problematic as law neutralises the stakes in a conflict 
by converting a struggle between parties into a dialogue between mediators.40 Law 
publicly represents social conflicts while distancing itself from them and offering an 
‘impartial’ and reasoned solution to social problems. Moreover, the recourse to law 
can be limited by exceptional decisions in situations of emergency or crisis. Given 
these limitations of how rights are inscribed politically through the mediation of law, 
it is important to see universal rights as only one aspect of the political reading of 
mobility. The other aspect is mass politics, political action by the mob, which 
challenges both the limitations of law and its possible suspension by exceptional 
decisions. 41 
 
Therefore, it is important to retain the category of the mob as immanent to rather than 
excluded from democratic practice. In democracy the people have traditionally been a 
split category. The reason for recovering the ‘mob’ as a category of democracy rather 
than as its outside, is not simply that enacting as well as challenging the split between 
the mob and the people has been constitutive of democracy.42 Looking more closely 
into this connection opens up the terrain of democratic politics that mobilities enact in 
relation to power structures as different from, but not unrelated to the terrain of rights. 
Political mobility 2: mobilisation and the political mob 
 
Let’s first return to Simmel. Through its power of equalisation, equivalence and 
reciprocity, money not only threatens hierarchical social relations but creates 
possibilities of new social relations beyond the limited confined of the pre-modern 
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associations – especially the guilds and feudal power relations. As Simmel has 
argued, in modernity groups are no longer formed based on similarity or proximity 
but through free choice. By making possible new form of sociality between strangers, 
money also makes possible the modern constitution of the masses or the ‘mob’. The 
strangers become numbers on the move dislocating and dislocated from the feudal and 
guild structures. Simmel’s writings explicitly link the phenomenon of mass culture 
and the emergence of large groups with the development of mature money economies, 
the metropolis and waged labour. The solidarity of wage labour and the solidarity of 
the mercantile class lead to large group affiliations that are radically different from the 
medieval concentric groups.43  
 
In this context, the double etymological meaning of mobility is hardly surprising. 
Mobility and its truncation, ‘the mob’, is a 17th century coinage by the Earl of 
Shaftesbury to refer to the mobile vulgus, the citizens-discontents marshalled by the 
Whigs for political processions and rallies.44 The term was introduced into English 
language to replace the more passive term ‘rabble’ and included, according to the 
novelist Henry Fielding, not just the rioters, but everyone in London’s lower classes 
who was present in the streets.45 The mob refers to politically motivated groups who 
are represented as numerous, mobile and an urban phenomenon. Metropolis, mobility 
and money are closely entwined, as Simmel has observed: ‘The modern city, 
however, is supplied almost exclusively by production for the market, that is, for 
entirely unknown purchasers who never appear in the actual field of vision of the 
producers themselves’.46 If rights are the political correlate of abstraction that money 
brings about, the ‘mob’ – i.e. mobile masses – can be seen as the political correlate of 
mass culture.  Simmel was positively inclined towards the phenomenon of large 
groups, arguing that ‘[o]nly as a member of the whole can he [the individual] 
contribute his part towards the realization of an idea’47. Yet, he interpreted groups 
dominantly sociologically rather than politically and did not develop the relationship 
between masses, movement and democracy. This political and democratic quality of 
the masses as ‘the mob’ is however of central importance for recapturing an extra-
legal political reading of mobility. 
 
Although the mobile vulgus or the fickle multitude had long been the object of 
contempt, from Roman and Greek writings until Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, starting 
from the 17th century the mob is seen to acquire ‘a tremendously real and symbolic 
force in society’.48 Increasingly, the mob is seen as a problem for democracy. The 
mob appeared as a disorderly force, whose actions are depoliticised either as 
economically determined – e.g. by hunger – or as socially irrational. While the people 
as the demos was perceived as the orderly force that democracies needed to foster and 
to sustain, the mob was the antinomy of the demos, the excess and unrest that could 
only be perceived as threatening for democratic forces. 
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The ‘mob’ or the mass has been theorised both as a problem for and as a constitutive 
force of democracy. Democratic theory has worked this terrain by decomposing and 
recomposing the notion of people in various ways. Many of theories of democracy 
contain a separation of the mob as vulgus from citizens.49 This ‘sanitising’ or 
‘rationalising’ of the category of the political people through the notion of citizens left 
the mob outside of democracy as the undisciplined part of the people.50  
 
Nonetheless, more recently, the democratic political potential of the ‘mob’ has been 
revitalised through an engagement with Spinoza’s writing. As Etienne Balibar has 
argued, by taking mass movement seriously as an object of investigation in its own 
right – that is, without immediately reducing it to the question of the constitution of 
the state – Spinoza articulated a fundamental paradox in democracy.51 Masses can be 
both destructive and creative of democratic practice. Thus, Spinoza oscillated between 
a series of terms to name the ‘masses’, most of which had pejorative meanings. The 
term which acquires a positive connotation represents numbers most directly – the 
multitude. 
  
As numbers, the multitude has the power to impose limits on the rulers. For Spinoza, 
there is a political connection that emerges not from an abstract representation of the 
masses but from their historical reality that consists in the capacity of the masses to 
turn numbers into a movement. This has different implications for democracy than 
universal rights. Democracy is grounded in the realisation that the masses needed to 
be included into the political entity through the representation of a double unity: a 
unity of the masses – as a people – and a unity between the masses and the rulers 
grounded in the latter representing the unity of all into a single figure of political rule. 
But how can this be done without turning the natural existence of the mass movement 
and its capacity for political action into an empty category – into something that 
disappears from view as an historical act and becomes an abstract idea of a people 
represented by the rulers? Spinoza makes clear that the masses as a real political force 
cannot be historically eliminated from democratic theory through representational 
politics; they remain a mobile numerical force that can physically move against 
political order.52 
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The legal constitution of this unity in contract theory tries to reduce the masses to an 
individualistic entity and to the problem of rights. Spinoza retains the historical reality 
of the masses in developing a numerical constitutional construction.53 While for 
Hobbes the multitude is a fragmented and individualistic entity that needs to be 
overcome to found a political unity, for Spinoza the masses are a historical physical 
force that is political because of its numbers. That means that for Spinoza the relation 
between ruler and masses is not mediated through distributing rights and obligations 
but by the management and mobilisation of numbers. The existing multitude is 
decomposed and then rationally recomposed in function of certain conditions (e.g. 
cultural conditions or economic conditions). The recompositions work on the one 
hand as a form of governing populations through statistical techniques (mapping 
categories of population and administering them in light of various policy objectives). 
On the other, masses of individuals are united into various bodies identified by a 
common idea (e.g. the hungry, the disenfranchised, the proletariat) and capable of 
moving ‘onto the street’ to challenge rulers, conditions of life, and political order.54 
 
Important for us here is that the democratic political terrain is opened up differently 
from the one in which mobility is constituted as a political practice through rights. 
This terrain is that of the representation of unity of rulers and masses as well as of a 
balancing of the relation of force between them. This terrain fundamentally depends 
on the real historical capacity of the masses to mobilise numbers into a political force 
that can threaten the ruling state of affairs. This political terrain is not defined by a 
distribution of rights but by a calculus of force depending on the capacity to 
physically move in numbers against others. In our understanding, this is what mobility 
as the mobilisation of the mob does. It introduces a different method of being 
democratic through being mobile. Thus, mobility as democratic practice of ‘the mob’ 
introduces a numerical calculus of force into a political terrain that tends to be 
dominated by the primacy of legal reasoning.  
 
The migrants crossing the Mediterranean are then not represented as iterations of the 
abstract notion of a state of nature made concrete at the territorial border, which 
justifies the use of violence to protect the already ‘contracted’ citizens of the 
European Union and the differentiation between those who can be part of the contract 
and those who have to remain outside because they embody the violence or chaos 
associated with the state of nature. From the perspective of mobility developed here, 
they present collective acts of mobility that bring a range of claims and projects to 
bear upon the European Union and its citizens. The collective dimension is at first 
instance purely numerical but it also opens a political terrain at the territorial and 
citizenry boundaries of Europe where mobility as a form of sociality negotiates the 
globalising economic and social structures of power. On the one hand, the migrants’ 
mobility appears to ‘embody’ the effects of globalisation. On the other hand, growing 
numbers of moving people also open a political terrain where the effects of global 
power structures need to be renegotiated. 
 
This understanding of the political dimensions of mobility leads to a different reading 
of the metaphors of flood, which are so often used in anti-immigration discourse, for 
example. In anti-immigration discourse, they are used to summon the spectre of the 
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state of nature and the limit of the political contract, thus replacing the complexity of 
claims and projects the immigrants’ mobility brings to bear upon the European Union 
with the abstractions of contract theory. But metaphors of flood also bring into play 
the sheer physical power of numbers of people on the move and the opening of a 
political terrain that is defined through a calculus of force rather than through 
institutionalised rights claims.55 These representations open politics towards violence 
against immigrants but  simultaneously invite the mobilisation of political action that 
depends not on mobilising a rights status but on a movement that has a capacity to 
dislodge the state of affairs.  
 
In commenting upon Spinoza’s introduction of the mass within democratic political 
theory, Warren Montag has argued that the multitude is irreducible to the antinomies 
of liberal thought as individual versus collective: ‘Neither a mere juxtaposition of 
separate individuals nor a collective entity that draws its legitimacy and function from 
its source in the voluntary consent of such individuals, the multitude precisely has no 
juridical determination or political form’.56 Mobility as mass, mob, multitude, or 
crowd is simultaneously excessive to individual rights and the collectivist people. 
This also implies that the limit of democracy is not totalitarianism because the masses 
can never be reduced to a collective unity, their movement is naturally one of 
decomposing and recomposing. The question of the limit of democratic mobilisation 
can also not be thought in terms of exceptionalism, which would place the mob 
outside of democratic politics because it destroys the predictability and rationality of 
the law.57 The mob is both opposed to law understood as decisionist and to its 
mediating role in social conflicts. The central question that arises here is what gives 
this political terrain that is defined through a calculus of force and the movement of 
numbers of people its democratic quality? As we will argue in the next section, 
similarly – but not identically – to universal rights the political democratic content of 
mass politics follows from its mobilisation of equality. 
 
Mobility as a democratic practice of equality 
 
Our political reading of mobility has started from the conditions of possibility of the 
circulation of money and has unpacked its political potential as universal rights and 
mass politics. We have argued that both rights and the force of the mob are two forms 
of political practice brought about by the particular constitution of mobility as abstract 
sociality with the stranger in modernity. Through the emergence of abstraction and 
sociality with the stranger, the abstract principle of equality enters the political terrain. 
Yet, equality does not simply inform the particular understanding of mobility in 
modernity, but also defines its content as democratic practice.58 The notion of equality 
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makes rights different from the privileging of a particular category of European white 
male and democratic mobilisation different from nationalist anti-immigration 
mobilisation. Contra the reformulations of rights as those of a suffering and 
traumatised subject in need for protection, mobility as instantiated in the circulation of 
money allows us to capture rights as formulas for equality in claim-making rather 
than being limited to assistance reception. 
 
In its double instantiation as universal rights and mass politics, mobility brings out the 
content-giving role of equality.  As democratic practices, universal rights and mass 
politics are informed by the principle of equality. On the one hand, equality ensures 
that law does not become either exceptional, verging onto dictatorship or a form of 
mediation that reinforces the power of the state or the anthropological assumptions 
about the ‘civilised’ subject of human rights. On the other hand, equality is 
fundamental to ensuring that democracy as expressed in the ‘mob’ does not amount to 
chaos and simply violence but to a reworking of relations between the citizens and the 
‘vulgus’ in reference to claims for assistance, redistribution, or access to the political 
field.  How does equality give content to mobility as a democratic practice? 
 
In the case of universal rights, equality can be thought of as a point of destination that 
is institutionally actualised in the foundational principle of formal equality before the 
law. Law processes social inequalities and discriminations in order to achieve a more 
just social order in conformity with the universal principles enshrined in it. 
Nonetheless, the processing of social wrongs in the judicial field is limited inasmuch 
as law offers to replace a system of institutional power which is found to be 
oppressive (dictatorship) with another system of institutional power (rule of law) 
which is less oppressive. Social inequalities are processed in light of this attainable 
equality. But as argued in the section on universal rights, drawing on law and rights 
significantly limits the way in which equality can be politically wielded. The judicial 
field is both institutionally and sociologically immanent to the system of governance 
through which the existing stratifications within the people and between the people 
and the vulgus are sanctioned.59 Entry in the judicial field takes place as an individual 
rights holder which instantiates often a double limitation: it re-iterates the distinction 
between those with rights and those without and it individualises and thus tends to 
particularise collective demands. 
 
While the enactment of equality through rights and law entails limitations, the politics 
of the mob is the supplement of collective power to the individualising aspect of 
human rights. Unlike the judicial realm, the politics of the mob takes equality as a 
maxim of action and not as a formal foundational principle or a goal to be achieved.60 
The politics of the mob claims equality through actual mobilisation from outside the 
law precisely for and by those who are excluded from the formal principle of legal 
equality because they do not have a status; those who are excluded by the 
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particularisation of universal rights can enter the political field through collective 
movement. Thus, while some immigrants can have access to law if they can make a 
claim to asylum, have been victims of trafficking, have joined the country for family 
reunification or, for example, have been discriminated against, other categories of 
immigrants fall out of the purview of the law. The judicial system can only minimally 
address undocumented migrants – even in situations when they are subjected to 
exploitation and abuse, they are not directly a party in the social conflict, but it is 
rather the state and the abuser (be those smugglers or employers) whose conflicts are 
mediated by law. Undocumented migrants in detention camps can, for example, 
trigger the mechanism of law by starting hunger strikes. Nonetheless, the mechanism 
of the hunger strike is often responded to in charitable and biopolitical terms rather 
than from the standpoint of achievable equality. Hence, undocumented migrants have 
been involved in numerous protests, strikes, demonstrations and solidarity movements 
with trade unions.61  
 
The recourse to rights and law and the recourse to the force of the mob are both 
democratic practices that supplement each other and supplement their mutual 
limitations. As Rancière has pointed out in relation to a tailors’ strike in 1833, claims 
of equality are possible given the ‘inscription of equality, as it appears in the founding 
texts, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man to the preamble of the Charter’.62 As 
equality is enshrined in legal and political texts, it can be subsequently translated, 
displaced and maximised in everyday life.63 Equality cannot be specified a priori, but 
happens through the mobilisation of the mob against the limits of the judicial system. 
The politics of the ‘mob’ functions both as a ‘check’ upon the democratic practices of 
rights (by challenging who is a subject of rights and which agents and institutions are 
allowed to be rights mediators) and an ‘invention’ of democratic practice.64  
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued for a political reading of mobility to rethink the conditions of 
possibility of democracy and democratic practice in the contemporary structures of 
world politics. Realising that the societal and economic dynamics are now seriously 
beyond the grip of democratic decision-making within a national state has often led to 
a demand for scaling up democratic institutions to a global scale. Regional scaling up 
can be seen to be a half-way step because it is meant to increase the leverage political 
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authority can have upon globalising socio-economic practices while nevertheless 
reproducing the problem that it locks democracy into territorially circumscribed 
institutions while the societal structures of power work across it. 
 
While mobility is simply read as a socio-economic practice in this literature, we have 
tried to rethink mobility as a political democratic practice. How do practices of 
mobility constitute democratic moments in relation to global structures of power? To 
answer this, we started from the historical relationship between mobility and 
democracy. The circulation of money creates a particular form of sociality with and 
between strangers, who are present in or move through territorially and organically 
defined communities but do not specifically belong to them. Universal rights are often 
taken to be the main vehicle through which the stranger’s mobility can be politically 
articulated in a democratic way. Although universal rights are vital for the political 
rendition of the abstract relations between strangers that emerge within the money 
economy, they also have a series of limitations. The individualising focus on rights 
holders, the often conservative sociological nature of the legal field, and the 
separation between those deemed worthy of legal status and those not produce 
inequalities in terms of a differential capacity of the mobile to enter the political field 
through rights claims. The democratic line running from mobility to the mobilisation 
of the mob makes visible an extra-legal tradition of collective democratic practice. 
While creating a terrain for democracy, this form of mobility contains the possibility 
of the continuous transformation and recomposition of the people as citizens through 
the figure of the mob. Therefore, the mob is not outside of the democratic political 
terrain but is immanent to it.  
 
Starting from this historical reconstruction of mobility as a condition of possibility 
and form of political (democratic) practice, it is possible to conceive of mobility as 
acting upon global structures of power. We have illustrated the possibilities of such a 
democratic reworking of the people and of the distribution of rights that the 
globalising structures of power constitute through migration. It is at the interstice 
between the mob and universal rights that transnational mobility can constitute global 
democratic practices bearing upon the globalised structures of world politics. When 
mobility as a particular form of sociality leads to claims of equality expressed through 
rights and the mobilisation of numbers of people, it constitutes a political terrain 
where power comes within the remit of democracy. In this reading, mobility is not 
simply a socio-economic flow that sparks questions about how to reconfigure 
democracy in a globalising world. Rather, it is a democratic political practice that is 
constitutive of and immanent to the world political terrain. 
 
